Beta-Testing the “Particular Machine”: The Machine-or-Transformation Test in Peril and Its Impact on Cloud Computing by Lee, Richard M.
 BETA-TESTING THE “PARTICULAR 
MACHINE”: THE MACHINE-OR-
TRANSFORMATION TEST IN PERIL AND ITS 
IMPACT ON CLOUD COMPUTING  
RICHARD M. LEE† 
ABSTRACT 
This Issue Brief examines recent cases addressing the patent 
eligibility of computer-implemented method claims and their 
implications for the development of cloud computing 
technologies. Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to endorse the 
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive patent eligibility 
inquiry, lower courts have continued to invalidate method claims 
using a stringent “particular machine” requirement alongside 
the requisite abstract ideas analysis. This Issue Brief argues that 
1) post-Bilski v. Kappos cases have failed to elucidate what 
constitutes a particular machine for computer-implemented 
methods; 2) in light of substantial variance among Federal 
Circuit judges’ Section 101 jurisprudence, the application of the 
particular machine requirement has become subject to a high 
degree of panel-dependency, such that its relevance for 
analyzing software method claims has come under question; 3) 
notwithstanding the unease expressed by practitioners and 
scholars for the future of cloud computing patents, the courts’ 
hardening stance toward computer-implemented method claims 
will do little to deter patenting in the cloud computing context. 
Instead, clouds delivering platform and software services will 
remain capable of satisfying the particular machine requirement 
and supporting patent eligibility, especially given the possible 
dilution of the particular machine requirement itself. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This Issue Brief examines recent cases addressing the patent 
eligibility of computer-implemented method claims and their impact on 
the development of cloud computing technologies. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to endorse the machine-or-transformation test as the 
exclusive Section 101 inquiry, lower courts have continued to invalidate 
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method claims using a stringent “particular machine” requirement 
alongside the requisite abstract ideas analysis. This Issue Brief argues 
that 1) post–Bilski v. Kappos cases have failed to elucidate what 
constitutes a particular machine for computer-implemented methods; 2) 
in light of substantial variance among Federal Circuit judges’ Section 
101 jurisprudence, the application of the particular machine requirement 
has become subject to a high degree of panel-dependency, such that its 
relevance for analyzing software method claims has come under 
question, 3) notwithstanding the unease expressed by practitioners and 
scholars for the future of cloud computing patents, the courts’ hardening 
stance toward computer-implemented method claims will do little to 
deter patenting in the cloud computing context. Instead, clouds 
delivering platform and software services will remain capable of 
satisfying the particular machine requirement and supporting patent 
eligibility, especially given the possible dilution of the particular 
machine requirement itself. 
I. MOT-LY CRUDE  
A. Patent Eligibility 101 
Section 101 of the Patent Act enumerates four patent eligible 
categories: “process, machine, manufacture,” and “composition of 
matter.”1 Section 100(b) in turn defines “process” as a “process, art or 
method,” which a number of courts have since characterized as an 
“unhelpful” tautology.2 When the Supreme Court confronted the 
challenge of defining “process” in the 1970s, it provided little guidance 
other than observing that Court precedent “forecloses a literal reading” of 
Section 101.3 Instead, the Court articulated a “fundamental principles” 
test that defines patentable subject matter through exceptions: a claim 
does not fall within patentable “process” if it is drawn to “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, [or] abstract principle.”4  
 
Absent a clear definition of either “process” or “abstract” ideas, 
the Federal Circuit articulated a number of competing tests for analyzing 
patent eligibility challenges before finally attempting to restore clarity in 
                                                      
1 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
2 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2010); Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 
581 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. 3D 
Labs Inc., No. 07-5948, 2009 WL 4899215, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) 
(quoting the Federal Circuit’s characterization of Section 100(b)’s definition of 
“process”).  
3 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (paraphrasing 
the Supreme Court’s holding on the definition of “process” in Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
4 Id. at 953. 
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In re Bilski. For example, in what the Federal Circuit designated the 
Freeman-Walter-Abele test, a process claim reciting an algorithm needed 
to apply to “physical elements or process steps” to ensure patent 
eligibility.5 Subsequently, the Federal Circuit formulated an alternative 
test through the Alappat-State Street line of cases, holding that a claimed 
process was patent eligible only if it “produce[d] a useful, concrete and 
tangible result.”6 
 
In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit rejected all alternative tests 
and established the “machine-or-transformation” (MOT) test as the sole 
inquiry for determining a process claim’s patent eligibility.7 Under the 
MOT test, a process is patent eligible only “if 1) it is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”8 In addition, the Federal Circuit articulated two 
corollaries to the MOT test. First, the particular machine or 
transformation must “impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope.”9 
However, simply limiting the scope of the claim to particular fields of 
use is “generally insufficient” for satisfying the first corollary.10 Second, 
the particular machine or transformation cannot “merely be insignificant 
extra-solution activity.”11 Citing concerns that a “competent draftsman 
could attach some form of post-solution activity” involving the recited 
machine to circumvent the MOT test, the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
commitment not to elevate form over substance when assessing patent 
claims.12 
 
When the Federal Circuit finally addressed the patent eligibility 
of software business methods in In re Bilski, it declined to institute a 
“broad exclusion over software or any other such category of subject 
matter” despite several prominent amici briefs urging to the contrary.13 
Because the case did not involve a software claim, the Federal Circuit 
                                                      
5 See id. at 958–59 (summarizing the final form of the Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test as articulated in In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905–07 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
6 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(1998) (establishing the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test first 
formulated in Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
7 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956. 
8 Id. at 954. 
9 Id. at 961. 
10 Id. at 957. 
11 Id. at 962.  
12 See id. at 957 (reiterating the Supreme Court’s concern in Parker v. Flook that 
patent attorneys would simply add post-solutions steps reciting machines to 
circumvent the MOT test, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). 
13 Id. at 960 n.23. 
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noted that such an exclusion would “be largely unhelpful in illuminating 
the distinctions between those software claims that are patent-eligible 
and those that are not.”14 Instead, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court’s 
holding in State Street, which subjected business method patents “to the 
same legal requirements” applied to any other method claims.15  
 
When the Supreme Court examined the Federal Circuit’s latest 
attempt to articulate a workable patent eligibility analysis, it rejected 
what it viewed as “two broad and atextual approaches” to interpreting 
Section 101.16 First, the Court refused to adopt the MOT test as the 
exclusive inquiry for deciding the patent eligibility of method claims, 
endorsing it as merely a “useful and important clue.”17 Instead, the Court 
returned Section 101 inquiry to the “fundamental principles” test, which 
held that a claimed process is unpatentable if drawn to “a law of nature, 
physical phenomena,” or an “abstract idea.”18 Second, as the Federal 
Circuit in In re Bilski, the Supreme Court declined to categorically 
exclude business methods from patentable subject matter.19 While noting 
that the abstract ideas bar may well form the basis for eliminating a 
“narrower category” of business method patents, the Court insisted that 
the Patent Act “leaves open the possibility” that at least some business 
methods would fall within patentable subject matter.20  
 
As several district courts opinions have since pointed out, 
although the four concurring Justices in Bilski v. Kappos argued for 
categorically excluding business methods from patentable subject matter, 
they shared the majority’s qualified endorsement of the MOT test’s 
merits.21 For example, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed approval in 
his concurring opinion by observing that “[f]ew, if any, processes cannot 
                                                      
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 960; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
16 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 3225. 
19 Id. at 3228. 
20 Id. at 3229. 
21 See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. 09-06918, 2010 WL 3360098, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Ultramercial I”) (noting that the four 
concurring Justices would have “taken the machine or transformation test to its 
logical limit” and held business methods as categorically unpatentable). In Mayo 
Collaborative Services et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories Inc., the Supreme 
Court’s most recent patentable subject matter decision, the 9-0 opinion did not 
disturb the Bilski v. Kappos holding with respect to the MOT test. 132 S.Ct. 
1289, 1296 (2012). 
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. . . . be evaluated” by the MOT test.22 Similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer 
credited the MOT test as “an important example of how a court can 
determine patentability.”23 Furthermore, because Justice Antonin Scalia 
joined parts of the plurality opinion which held that not many patentable 
processes “lie beyond” the MOT test, a district court later observed that 
“at least five (and maybe all) Justices seem to agree that the machine or 
transformation test should retain much of its utility” after Bilski v. 
Kappos.24 
B. The Absent Particular Machine  
Despite several Supreme Court Justices’ qualified approval, at 
least half of the machine-or-transformation test has never taken concrete 
form. In particular, courts have been unable to clearly identify what 
constitutes a “particular” machine in the software context, even while 
invalidating method claims for failure to be tied to such a machine. In 
Bilski v. Kappos, both the majority and concurring Supreme Court 
Justices conducted thorough textual analyses on the definition of 
“process.”25 Yet neither side examined whether any definition of 
“particular” provided sufficient clarity and certainty to practitioners. In 
In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit panel likewise sidestepped the challenge 
of elucidating the particular machine requirement, remaining content to 
“leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine 
implementation” and the task of determining “whether or when recitation 
of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.”26  
 
However, neither the Federal Circuit nor any district court since 
In re Bilski has identified such contours, despite having decided at least 
eight cases featuring patent eligibility challenges against method claims 
in software patents.27 In as late as March 2011, the District Court of the 
                                                      
22 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235. 
23 Id. at 3259. 
24 Ultramercial I, 2010 WL 3360098, at *3. 
25 See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (examining “process” 
as defined in Noah Webster’s first American dictionary).  
26 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
27 See generally SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 601 F.3d 1319, (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (holding a GPS receiver as meeting the particular machine 
requirement without clarifying the standard for determining what constitutes 
such a machine); see also Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“Ultramercial II”); Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. 3D Labs Inc., No. 07-
5948, 2009 WL 4899215, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, (D.D.C. 2011); Glory Licensing, LLC v. 
Toys R Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 WL 1870591, (D.N.J. 2011); Ultramercial 
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District of Columbia noted that courts still had not “clearly answered” at 
which point a computer-implemented method would become 
“sufficiently tied to a particular computer.”28 What little concrete 
guidance district courts have provided stems entirely from pre-In re 
Bilski law. Even then, such decisions explain only why the claims at 
issue failed the MOT test, not what would clear the “particular machine” 
hurdle. Given such ambiguity, as recently as May 2011, the District 
Court of New Jersey continued to describe the state of patent eligibility 
law governing computer-implemented method claims with nothing more 
than: “the use of a programmed computer” alone cannot satisfy the MOT 
test.29  
C. The Patentable Subject Matter Spectrum 
Because the underlying technology in difficult patent eligibility 
cases rarely fits into rigid categories, practitioners and scholars alike 
have preferred to envision a continuous spectrum of potentially eligible 
inventions when assessing the merits of various Section 101 tests.30 At 
one end of the spectrum exist the traditional innovations that yield 
concrete industrial applications, such as engine designs or new chemical 
manufacturing processes. At the other end are “pure” business methods, 
such as the attempt to patent the concept of hedging in In re Bilski. In the 
middle of the spectrum are the more difficult “hybrid” claims, which 
implement steps of a business method through software.31  
II. CUTTING THE BILSKIAN KNOT  
A. Mounting Reversals: What Hasn’t Made the Cut  
Post-Bilski v. Kappos case law provides only limited guidance 
for practitioners seeking to protect clients from a patent eligibility 
challenge. Since the Supreme Court’s directive to return Section 101 
inquiry to its fundamental principles roots, most courts have applied both 
                                                                                                                         
I, 2010 WL 3360098; DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Dealertrack I”) (all lacking definition of “particular”).   
28 CLS Bank Intern., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 237.  
29 Glory Licensing, 2011 WL 1870591, at *2.  
30 See, e.g., John V. Biernacki, Bilski and the Discernment of Patent Eligibility 
for Business Method Patents, in THE IMPACT OF BILSKI ON BUSINESS METHOD 
PATENTS, LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING PROCEDURAL CHANGES, 
FORMING NEW PATENT FILING STRATEGIES, AND FORECASTING FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENTS, 2009 WL 2510890, *7 (Eddie Fournier ed., 2009) (describing 
the subject matter spectrum); see also Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted 
Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1327 
(2011) (noting that “subject matter category delineation is notoriously elusive”). 
31 Biernacki, supra note 29, at *7. 
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the MOT and the abstract idea analyses.32 On one hand, recent cases 
evince a more stringent particular machine requirement. Reciting terms 
as broad as the “internet” or as generic as “format instructions” has 
clearly proven insufficient for tying method claims to a particular 
machine.33 On the other hand, while more specific programming details 
could in theory transform a general-purpose computer into the elusive 
“particular machine,” the Federal Circuit has declined to elucidate what 
such recitation might entail. Unfortunately, confusion over the particular 
machine requirement mirrors the state of the abstract idea analysis, for 
which courts have articulated an even more cryptic test excluding 
methods that could “as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a 
human’s mind.”34 As a result, despite the prevalence of parallel MOT 
and abstract ideas analyses, the latter doctrine’s restoration has hardly 
helped to clear confusion plaguing the former. In the meantime, as courts 
continue to sidestep the challenge of articulating a workable particular 
machine requirement, applicants will continue to face uncertainty over a 
crucial threshold issue. 
 
For example, in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,35 
the Federal Circuit held that a method for detecting online credit card 
fraud failed the MOT test, because the “Internet” recited in the claim did 
not qualify as a particular machine.36 The patent at issue notably did not 
tie its method claim to any particular algorithm. It covered instead any 
fraud detection method that tested whether the IP address using a credit 
card was consistent with IP addresses associated with the same card in 
past transactions.37 In its abstract idea analysis, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that Cybersource’s method claim covered an unpatentable 
                                                      
32 See, e.g., Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1371, 1373 (holding the method claims at 
issue ineligible under both the MOT and the abstract idea analyses); see also 
CLS Bank Intern., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 236, 246 (holding the method claims at 
issue ineligible under both the MOT and the abstract idea analyses). 
33 See, e.g., Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1370 (holding that the “Internet” recited in 
the claims fails to qualify as a particular machine because it functioned as a 
source of data only); see also Glory Licensing, 2011 WL 1870591, at *3 
(holding that “format instructions” and “content instructions” were generic 
terms insufficient for tying the method claim to a particular machine).  
34 Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1376; see also Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit “does not presume” to define what constitutes an abstract idea beyond 
recognizing that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself 
manifestly). 
35 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1372.  
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“mental process,” because a person could infringe by merely inferring 
fraud when a single IP address used different credit cards with different 
user names and billing addresses.38 In response to the patentee’s 
contention that the method was sufficiently tied to a particular machine – 
in this case the “Internet” – the Federal Circuit observed that the Internet 
functioned only as a data source and therefore could not have “performed 
the fraud detection steps of the claimed method.”39 Because such data-
gathering steps “cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory,” 
the Federal Circuit held that Cybersource’s method claim failed the 
particular machine requirement.40   
 
Similarly, in FuzzySharp Technologies. Inc. v. 3D Labs Inc.,41 
the Federal Circuit approved of a district court’s analysis in holding that 
a method claim failed the particular machine requirement, despite 
vacating the lower court’s judgment in the wake of Bilski v. Kappos.42 
The patentee had argued in the District Court of the Northern District of 
California that its method for improving 3D graphics was tied to a 
particular machine on the strength of references to “computer storage” 
and “computer.”43 The District Court held that such a “passing reference” 
to hardware failed the MOT test and could not impart patent eligibility to 
methods otherwise drawn to calculations and algorithms.44 Although the 
Federal Circuit on appeal recognized that the failure to satisfy the MOT 
test no longer ensured patent ineligibility under Bilski v. Kappos, it 
agreed with the District Court’s application of the particular machine 
requirement.45 Since general references to a computer imposed only two 
limitations – that the machine must be able to compute and store data – 
the Federal Circuit pointed out that Fuzzysharp’s recitation of such 
functions was “essentially synonymous” with a computer.46 Therefore, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the hardware pieces recited in 
Fuzzysharp’s patent failed to impose “meaningful limits” on claim 
scope.47  
 
                                                      
38 Id. at 1370. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 FuzzySharp Tech. Inc. v. 3DLabs Inc., No. 2010-1160, 2011 WL 5248297, at 
*3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2011). 
42  Id. 
43 Id. at *2. 
44 Id. at *4. 
45 Id. at *3. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *4. 
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Finally, in Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys "R" Us, Inc.,48 the 
District Court of New Jersey denied the patent eligibility of a method for 
“processing information from a template file” using “content 
instructions. . . . [and] customizable transmission format instructions” on 
a “programmed computer.”49 While recitations of content and format 
instructions represented the patentee’s only attempts to impose specific 
limitations on claim scope, the District Court noted that the patent neither 
defined such “generic” terms nor shed light on “what the instructions 
entail,” or “who programs them according to what specifications.”50 The 
court thus held that the method claim fell short of the particular machine 
requirement.51 As with the Federal Circuit in Cybersource, the District 
Court did not attempt to pinpoint at what stage a computer-implemented 
method would become sufficiently tied to a particular machine.  
B. MOT in Peril: Panel Dependency  
As courts continue to struggle with identifying the particular 
machine, recent cases reveal an even more troubling dissonance among 
Federal Circuit judges regarding the relevance of the particular machine 
requirement to analyzing computer-implemented methods. On one end of 
the spectrum, Federal Circuit Judge Randall Rader sees little value in the 
“confusing terminology” of the MOT test and prefers confining Section 
101 to a “coarse” filter with no role for invalidating claims.52 As to 
method claims in software, Judge Rader supports abolishing the 
particular machine requirement altogether, in light of the blurring “line 
of demarcation” between hardware and software technologies.53 On the 
other end of the spectrum, Judge Timothy Dyk remains more willing to 
use the MOT test to curtail excessively broad claims and has even come 
close to limiting particular machines to non-computing hardware 
devices.54 Although Judge Dyk has softened his stance since Bilski v. 
Kappos by allowing computing hardware to qualify as a particular 
machine, panels featuring Judge Dyk have continued to rely on the MOT 
                                                      
48 Glory Licensing, LLC v. Toys R Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 WL 1870591, at 
*1 (D.N.J. 2011). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at *3.  
51 Id. 
52 Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
[hereinafter “Ultramercial II”]. 
53 Id. 
54 See SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (holding a particular machine cannot merely permit “a solution to be 
achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing 
calculations”). 
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test to invalidate computer-implemented method claims.55 Given the 
variance in Section 101 jurisprudence articulated in recent cases and the 
lack of Supreme Court guidance, the relevance of the MOT test itself 
will likely remain subject to a high degree of panel-dependency.  
 
 The gulf between various Federal Circuit Judges was evident 
even before the Supreme Court rejected the MOT test as the exclusive 
Section 101 inquiry. In as early as In re Bilski, Judge Rader cast the 
MOT test as a “judicial innovation” and promoted an alternative 
conception of patent eligibility as a generous hurdle that left invalidation 
to other statutory requirements.56 In a colorful dissent, Judge Rader 
accused the In re Bilski majority of “legal sophistry” in having read 
exclusions into Section 101 when the statutory language provided no 
such “hint.”57 The admonishment is curious given the necessity and 
pedigree of judge-made law in determining the boundaries of “process.” 
Nonetheless, Judge Rader characterized the MOT test as a “circuitous, 
judge-made” law with no statutory foundation.58 Instead, he 
distinguished Section 101, which ought to “provide generously” for 
patent eligibility, from the more stringent patentability requirements that 
can better screen out unpatentable inventions.59 Because the Patent Act 
focused “patentability on the specific characteristics of the claimed 
invention” more appropriately addressed under the doctrines of novelty 
and utility, Rader faulted the majority for shifting the focus to the wrong 
section and imposing limitations on “process” beyond its “broad and 
ordinary meaning.”60  
 
In contrast to Judge Rader, Judge Dyk not only authored a 
concurring opinion in full agreement with the In re Bilski endorsement of 
the MOT test, but also formulated a more stringent version of the test by 
elevating the hardware requirement for particular machines.61 In SiRF 
Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,62 a pre-Bilski v. Kappos case, Judge 
Dyk authored an opinion affirming the patent eligibility of two method 
claims related to Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies, since 
                                                      
55 See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012 WL 164439, at *17 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
[hereinafter “Dealertrack II”] (holding the method claims at issue were not tied 
to a particular machine). 




60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
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the GPS receiver recited was “essential” for performing the claimed 
methods.63 Although the outcome was uncontroversial, Judge Dyk also 
held that a particular machine cannot “function solely as an obvious 
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., 
through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.”64 
While contrasting the GPS receiver with a computer lent additional 
support to the holding, Judge Dyk’s language veered toward creating a 
distinction between computing and non-computing hardware that was 
unnecessary for reaching the same outcome. Once the court determined 
that a GPS receiver performs functions essential to the method and 
imposes meaningful limitation on claim scope, the method was clearly 
patent eligible. Yet, Judge Dyk’s opinion explicitly referred to a 
computer performing calculations as a machine that would be 
insufficient to meet the particularity requirement, despite the fact that 
computing devices do little more than enabling algorithms to be 
performed more quickly.  
 
In the wake of Bilski v. Kappos, however, Judge Dyk has 
moderated his stance by allowing both computing and non-computing 
hardware to qualify as particular machines when provided with sufficient 
programming specifications. For example, in DealerTrack, Inc. v. 
Huber,65 a Federal Circuit panel including Judge Dyk affirmed a lower 
court decision holding “a computer aided method of managing a credit 
application” patent ineligible.66 The claims at issue included three 
hardware components: 1) a central processor “consisting of a specially 
programmed computer hardware and database,” 2) a “remote application 
entry and display device,” and 3) a “remote funding source terminal 
device.”67 The District Court had earlier dismissed the central processor 
as a general computer given the patentee’s failure to “specify precisely 
how the computer hardware and database are ‘specially programmed.’”68 
In addition, the District Court had held that the remaining hardware 
pieces recited also fell short of the particular machine requirement, 
because the claim construction order indicated that such hardware could 
include “any device,” even a “dumb terminal.”69 On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the patentee’s contention that the phrase “computer-
                                                      
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1333 (emphasis added). 
65 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012 WL 164439, at *15 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
[hereinafter “Dealertrack II”]. 
66 Id. 
67 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
[hereinafter “Dealertrack I”]. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
186 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW [Vol.  11  
aided” in the preamble could render the claims patent eligible, holding 
instead that the claim covered the abstract idea of “processing 
information through a clearinghouse.”70  The Federal Circuit’s opinion 
marked a compromise between the pre-Bilski Section 101 views of Judge 
Rader and Judge Dyk. In contrast to Judge Rader’s hostility toward 
judicial innovation, Judge Dyk’s opinion in Dealertrack continued to 
rely on the MOT test. Repeating a familiar refrain, Judge Dyk held that 
the “computer” recited failed the particular machine requirement, 
because the patent language was “silent as to how a computer aids the 
method” and covered usage with “any existing or future-devised 
machine.”71 At the same time, despite citing SiRF as support, Judge Dyk 
in DealerTrack remained open to the possibility that computers could 
satisfy the particular machine requirement with sufficient programming 
specifications.72  
 
In contrast, Bilski v. Kappos only emboldened Judge Rader in his 
opposition to the MOT test, to the point that his most recent opinion 
outright denies the test’s applicability to computer-implemented 
methods. In Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC (“Ultramercial II”),73 Judge 
Rader authored an opinion reversing a district court decision that held a 
method for distributing copyrighted advertising material online 
unpatentable.74 The claims at issue described “a method for distribution 
of products over the Internet via a facilitator” and a method for 
downloading the “media product accessed.”75 Judge Rader first applied 
the abstract idea analysis and held that the claims covered more than the 
“mere idea” of using advertising as a form of currency.76 Instead, the 
claims disclosed “a practical application” through steps that “are likely to 
require intricate and complex computer programming” as well as steps 
that require “specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market 
environment.”77 Citing the Supreme Court’s view that the MOT test 
applied to Industrial Age processes better than Information Age 
inventions, Judge Rader ignored the particular machine rule and its 
corollaries. Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Cybersource, 
                                                      
70 Dealertrack II, 2012 WL 164439, at *15. 
71 Id. at *16. 
72 Id. at *17 (holding that the patent “does not specify how the computer 
hardware and database are specially programmed to perform the steps claimed,” 
thus allowing in theory that sufficient programming details could ensure patent 
eligibility).   
73 Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1330. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1324. 
76 Id. at 1328. 
77 Id. (emphasis added).  
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just a month prior to Ultramercial II, Judge Rader made no attempt to 
determine whether the “Internet” in Ultramercial’s patent functioned as a 
mere data source. Nor did he scrutinize the level of programming 
specifications. Content that some of the steps in the method claims would 
likely require “complex computer programming,” Judge Rader declared 
the Federal Circuit “simply find[s] the claims here to be patent 
eligible.”78  
 
Judge Rader’s reasoning also strongly suggested that the 
particular machine requirement would become altogether irrelevant to 
cases involving computer-implemented methods. First, in response to the 
lower court’s decision that the hardware recited in Ultramercial’s claims 
failed to qualify as a particular machine, Judge Rader cited his own 
concurring opinion in In re Alappat seventeen years earlier: 
 
the inventor can describe the invention in terms of a dedicated 
circuit or a process that emulates that circuit.  Indeed, the line of 
demarcation between a dedicated circuit and a computer 
algorithm accomplishing the identical task is frequently blurred 
and is becoming increasingly so as the technology develops.79 
 
Since software processes have become  “interchangeable” with 
hardware circuits, Judge Rader concluded that new inventions “could be 
claimed in terms of . . . . hardware circuits,” or “more efficiently, in 
terms of the programming.”80 In allowing both hardware and software to 
support patent eligibility, Judge Rader effectively abolished the 
requirement for a particular machine in computer-implemented method 
cases. Second, Judge Rader also reiterated the conception of Section 101 
that he advanced in In re Bilski – a “coarse filter” with no role in 
invalidating patents based on vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or failure 
to enable.81 By affirming the patent eligibility of Ultramercial’s method 
claims despite the admitted lack of any “particular mechanism” 
specified, Judge Rader effectively established the abstract idea analysis 
as the only relevant inquiry for computer-implemented methods. Moving 
forward, the recitation of hardware components will likely become 
unnecessary if the Federal Circuit panel hearing the case endorses Judge 
Rader’s views.  
                                                      
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 1329. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING PATENTS  
A. Deuxième Machine as Deus Ex Machina  
In light of a recent string of successful Section 101 challenges, 
some practitioners and in-house counsel have expressed unease with the 
future of software patents in cloud computing. For example, Yao Wang 
of Venable LLP warned that the Federal Circuit’s “characterization of 
the Internet” may become “a hindrance to software inventions in cloud 
computing, which relies on the Internet and collects data from the 
Internet.”82 Similarly, Peter Kang, a partner at Sidley Austin LLP, 
observed that “cloud computing relates not only to [the] development” of 
methods for data communication and integration, it also “relates to 
business models,” which “have proliferated due to the technology 
enabled by cloud computing.”83 In light of the developing case law under 
Bilski, Kang called upon patent attorneys to steer clear of “Section 101 
issues by tailoring claims appropriately to avoid unduly abstract 
processes.”84 Horatio Gutierrez, the Deputy General Counsel at 
Microsoft, likewise warned that because the patentability debate in the 
United States “shows no sign of abating,” the scope for patent protection 
of software “seem[s] likely to become more complex and less predictable 
in the cloud environment.”85 
 
Given disagreements between Federal Circuit judges as to 
Section 101’s proper role, the treatment of computer-implemented 
method claims will likely become subject to a high degree of panel 
dependency. In cases where Judge Rader’s vision of Section 101 as a 
mere “coarse filter” prevails, applicants should have little to fear from a 
patent eligibility challenge. It is important to note that, while means-plus-
function claims still must provide sufficient programming specifications 
to satisfy definiteness requirements under Section 112, the same 
requirements have yet to be extended to method claims.86 Therefore, 
                                                      
82 Yao Wang, CyberSource Decision Raises the Patent-Eligibility Bar for 
Software, VENEABLE LLP IP BUZZ, (September 7, 2011), 
http://www.venable.com/cybersource-decision-raises-the-patent-eligibility-bar-
for-software/. 
83 Peter H. Kang, Intellectual Property and Legal Issues Surrounding Cloud 
Computing, at 15, 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/papers/MWI/11MWI/2011%20MWI
%20Meeting%20Materials/Kang_Paper.pdf. 
84 Id.  
85 Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: the Future of Intellectual 
Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 589, 593, (2011). 
86 Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that computer-implemented means-plus-function 
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method claims would be unlikely to fall at either the indefiniteness or 
patent eligibility hurdles, as long as the steps in performing the method 
are likely to require complex programming.  
 
Yet, even in cases where the particular machine requirement 
remains relevant, an analysis accounting for disparate types of cloud 
computing suggests that Bilski’s impact should vary in proportion to the 
importance of the cloud services to performing the claimed methods. For 
example, an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) or utility computing cloud 
service (such as Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud) – which provides 
data storage, computation capacity and virtual machine instances on a 
pay-as-you-use basis – seems unlikely to satisfy the particular machine 
requirement. When a cloud serves as a source of data or a rentable 
general-purpose machine, it merely replaces the off-cloud resources that 
users would have otherwise owned. Therefore, similar to the “Internet” 
in CyberSource, such clouds fail the MOT test’s second corollary, which 
disqualifies those hardware components that perform only extra-solution 
activities.  
 
On the other hand, a Platform as a Service (PaaS) or Software as 
a Service (SaaS) would likely satisfy the “particular machine” 
requirement that most Federal Circuit judges endorse. Unlike hardware 
components that perform preliminary data-gathering steps, the cloud at 
the PaaS and SaaS level perform at least some steps in the claimed 
method. At the same time, such clouds also impose sufficient “specific 
limitations” upon claim scope. For instance, in contrast to Amazon’s 
cloud with no programming language restrictions, Google’s App Engine 
and other niche competitors support only designated languages, and 
sometimes a proprietary language.87 Google’s App Engine also provides 
Google-specific application platform interfaces and client-side tools.88 
Such limitations should further bolster the PaaS and SaaS clouds’ claim 
                                                                                                                         
claims failed the definiteness requirement, because it lacked sufficient disclosure 
of algorithm used to perform the functions claimed). 
87 See, e.g., Google App Engine Python Runtime, GOOGLE,  
https://developers.google.com/appengine/docs/python/runtime#Pure_Python 
(last visited May 19, 2012); Google App Engine Java Sandbox, GOOGLE, 
https://developers.google.com/appengine/docs/java/runtime#The_Sandbox (last 
visited May 19, 2012) (demonstrating Google App Engine supports two 
application environments).  
88 See, e.g., Google App Engine Experimental Features, GOOGLE, 
https://developers.google.com/appengine/docs/features#Experimental_Features 
(last visited May 19, 2012);Google App Engine Production Features, GOOGLE, 
https://developers.google.com/appengine/docs/features#Production_Features 
(last visited May 19, 2012) (listing some application platform interfaces 
available).  
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to qualifying as a particular machine as opposed to any “existing or 
future machine.”  
 
Finally, recent Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
decisions applying a diluted particularity requirement indicate that the 
impact on cloud computing could take an even more benign direction. 
For instance, in Ex Parte Oleg Wasynczuk,89 the Board examined a 
simulation system “using a distributed computer network, wherein 
subsystems can be simulated independently.”90 The Board held that the 
method claim at issue – which included a first simulating step performed 
on a “first physical computing device” and a second simulation step 
performed on a “second physical computing device,” – was sufficiently 
tied to a particular machine because the second physical computing 
device qualified as such a “particular apparatus.”91 The Board’s 
conclusion rested on two findings of fact: 1) “in some situations, multiple 
models are executed on multiple distinct computers,” and 2) “in other 
situations, multiple models can be executed on a single computer.”92  
 
Ex Parte Wasynczuk represents a particularly sloppy decision 
given its cursory application of the particular machine requirement. First, 
the Board’s reasoning focused on the individuality of the second 
computing device, rather than any attribute that rendered it “particular.” 
Moreover, the Board did not apply either corollary to the MOT rule, such 
as investigating whether the second computing device was sufficiently 
important for the claimed method. When the Board’s own fact findings 
indicated that running multiple simulation models on one computer was 
possible in some situations, the Board should have at least examined 
whether the patentee was attempting to sidestep the particular machine 
requirement by reciting a straw-man machine.  
 
If courts adopt a particularity requirement focusing merely on 
the individuality of the machines, innovators would likely face a much 
more lenient MOT test. Claims that were previously unpatentable in a 
single machine setting would become eligible, as long as the patentee 
adds a second, server-side machine as a deus ex machina. Allowing a 
nonessential server to qualify as the particular machine would clearly 
violate the second corollary of the MOT test, which holds that machines 
performing extra-solution activities are insufficient. Moreover, as more 
technologies migrate onto the cloud, such a toothless rule would impose 
                                                      
89 Ex parte Wasynczuk, No. 2008-1496, 2008 WL 2262377, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 
2, 2008). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at *1, *2, *10. 
92 Id. at *3.  
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strong disincentives on innovation by granting too many patents, since 
cloud computing technologies easily accommodate such “second” 
physical computing devices. So far, at least one district court has cited 
the Ex Parte Wasynczuk analysis in a Section 101 case without 
criticizing its reasoning.93 The potential for lax application at the district 
court level should further allay fears of applicants.   
B. Other Arrows in the Quiver 
Equally importantly to the future of cloud computing, 
practitioners can continue to rely on other claim types to shield clients 
from patent eligibility challenges. Given the integration of multiple 
client-side and server-side machines, cloud-computing technology 
should always be able to support at least one system or apparatus claim. 
Therefore, stripping method claims from the patent attorney’s arsenal 
does not mean that the underlying invention will yield no patentable 
claims at all. A more stringent particularity requirement merely prevents 
applicants from claiming their ideas too broadly by using method claims. 
Accordingly, patent attorneys should continue using system or apparatus 
claims to protect client inventions related to cloud computing 
technology. If a method claim is necessary, patent attorneys should 
distinguish the system or apparatus claims from the method claims as 
much as possible to prevent both claims falling to a Section 101 
challenge.  
 
Whether the MOT test applies exclusively to method claims or 
not, the availability of other claim types does not mean patent attorneys 
should redraft method claims to resemble other claim types in order to 
sidestep the MOT test. In light of the Federal Circuit’s guidance to assess 
claims based on substance rather than form, courts have reclassified 
claim types before applying the MOT test. For example, in Every Penny 
Counts, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp.,94 the District Court of the Middle 
District of Florida examined a method claiming “a system where by 
consumers can save and/or donate a portion of a credit or debit 
transaction.”95 Although the claim was “categorized as a system,” the 
District Court concluded that the claim was in fact drawn to a method, 
because the claim has “substantial practical application. . . . [only] in 
connection with computers, cash registers and networks,” yet is “not 
                                                      
93 See Glory Licensing, LLC v. Toys R Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 WL 
1870591, at *3 (D.N.J. 2011) (analyzing the method claim at issue using the 
framework articulated in Ex Parte Wasynczuk, 2008 WL 2262377, at *1). 
94 Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., No. 07-042, 2009 WL 
6853402, *1 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2009). 
95 Id. 
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comprised of those devices.”96 The District Court then held that the 
disguised method claim failed the particular machine requirement for 
being drawn to “a mathematical algorithm.”97 Similarly, the Federal 
Circuit in Cybersource emphasized that “[r]egardless of what statutory 
category” the claim language “is crafted to literally invoke, we look to 
the underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.”98 Thus, when 
assessing Cybersource’s Beauregard claim, the Federal Circuit looked 
past its format and held that the claim was in fact drawn to “a method for 
detecting credit card fraud, not a manufacture for storing computer-
readable information,” before concluding that the claim failed the MOT 
test.99 Given the Federal Circuit’s willingness to reclassify claims, patent 
attorneys should refrain from attempting to circumvent the MOT test by 
rewriting a method claim into another format. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Justice Stevens opened his concurring opinion in Bilski v. 
Kappos by cautioning, “it is especially important that the law remain 
stable and clear” in the “area of patents.”100 Despite Justice Stevens’s 
warning, recent cases have instead added to the uncertainty surrounding 
an important threshold issue facing applicants. Not only have courts 
failed to elucidate at what point a general computer becomes a particular 
machine, but the Federal Circuit has also thrown the MOT test’s 
applicability to computer-implemented methods into doubt, subjecting its 
interpretation to a high degree of panel dependency. Nonetheless, the 
courts’ hardening stance toward computer-implemented methods will be 
unlikely to deter patenting in the cloud computing context, as long as the 
bundled cloud services extend beyond utility computing. Clouds that 
deliver platforms and software services should continue to qualify as 
particular machines even under the more stringent MOT test evinced in 
recent cases. Combined with the continued availability of other claim 
types and the potential for a dilution of the particular machine 
requirement itself, the future of cloud computing should remain sunny 
and spotless.  
                                                      
96 Id. at *2.  
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